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Reviews
Problemy sravnitel'nogo issledovaniia zakonodatel'stva soiuznykh
respublik. Edited by A.I. Ishanov et al. Tashkent: izd-vo "FAN"
Uzbekskoi SSR, 1974. Pp. 236. Price: 1 ruble, 36 kopecks.
In an earlier contribution to this journal' the present writer called
attention to growing interest, in the Soviet Union, in the application
of the comparative method to the study of Soviet domestic law as
evidenced by the appearance of two criminal law texts devoted
exclusively to Belorussian and Ukrainian criminal law. The volume
herein reviewed elaborates that theme and endeavours to come
expressly to grips with the methodological issues implicit in
analyzing a single legal system from a comparative standpoint.
The impetus for studying Soviet law from a comparative
perspective evidently dates from the late 1960s and owes much to
the efforts of Uzbek jurists. The research tasks of the Comparative
Law Sector of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Uzbek
Academy of Sciences received the formal sanction of the State
Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR Academy of
Sciences in 1968; these include: (a) the theoretical study and
generalization of the experience of socialist construction in the
union republics using the comparative method; (b) identifying the
general societal laws of development and specific pecularities in
union republic constitutional law; (c) working out the basic
principles for applying the comparative method to various branches
of Soviet law; (d) preparing proposals for improving Soviet
legislation and the structure of state administration, and (e) training
comparatists. The Institute of State and Law of the Ukrainian
Academy of Sciences also formed a sector in June 1969 to deal with
the international legal activities of the Ukraine and with
comparative
constitutional
and
administrative
law
[gosudarstvovedenie]. At a comparative law conference held in
January 1970 by the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of
Soviet Legislation, which is a part of the USSR Ministry of Justice,
the need for more comparative investigations of Soviet law was
stressed.
1. W. E. Butler, Comparative Criminal Law Within the Soviet Union: A Review
(1973), 1 Dalhousie L. J. 356.
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The present volume, collectively authored, is published jointly by
three Institutes: the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Uzbek
Academy of Sciences, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of
Soviet Legislation, and the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of
State and Law under the editorship of A.I. Ishanov, Sh.Z. Urazaev,
I.S. Samoschchenko, A.A. Tille, M.M. Faiziev, and A.F.
Shebanov. It consists of four chapters treating respectively: (I)
General Problems of Comparative Law; (II) Socio-Political Bases of
the Unity and Peculiarities of USSR and Union Republic
Legislation (both written by A.A. Tille and M.M. Faiziev); (II)
Methodological Bases of the Comparative Study of Union Republic
Legislation (A.F. Shebanov and Faiziev); (IV) Comparative
Investigations of Individual Branches of Union Republic Law,
including constitutional law (Faiziev and A.A. Karimova), civil
law (A. Iu. Kabalkin), family law (A. I. Pergament), labour law (T.
S. Sagdullaeb), criminal law (V.I. Ivanov), and correctional labour
law (L. G. Krakhmal'nik).
The usefulness of comparison as a method of legal research, after
what are described as "warm" discussions in the 1950-60s among
socialist jurists, would now appear to be beyond serious question in
the Soviet Union. Mr. Tille is a bit apologetic for touching upon
basic questions of methodology, placing the comparative method
firmly among the general principles of scientific thought together
with analogy, experiment, deduction, induction and others, but he
believes the renewed interest among Soviet jurists in comparative
law naturally leads to a restatement, if not re-evaluation, of its basic
aims. He is of course at pains to insist that the comparative method
need not be limited to the study of two or more legal systems, as it is
equally applicable to investigations into Soviet law. This is not such
a remarkable view. Many North American jurists are among those
who have claimed that comparative studies have been nurtured by
interest in the inter-provincial or inter-state legal concerns, and
there is an increasing realization that the comparative method can
provide useful insights into the international legal system. But in its
Soviet context the issue does have some peculiar facets which
should be pondered.
There exist in a sense two inclinations in Soviet legal doctrine.
One is to stress the monolithic unity of the Soviet state and its
legislation. While acknowledging the existence of differences or
peculiarities in union republic law, this view regards them as
insignificant and not meriting special attention. A typical example is
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to be found in a recent criminal law treatise:
The system of the Special Part of the now prevailing union
republic criminal codes is basically identical, although there are
certain differences which are not of principle nor substantive.
They relate to the consecutive placement of chapters and to the
positioning of individual crimes by chapters. Moreover, there are
differences in defining 2the constituent elements of specific crimes
and their punishments.
The contrary inclination, utilizing the same data, believes the
statement quoted above is illogical. If different orderings of
chapters and articles in a code are to be dismissed as
inconsequential, then what significance, they argue, does the
system of the code have? And if differences in the constituent
elements of and punishments for a crime are not important, has not
the very science of criminal law been cast aside? As expressed in
another criminal law text:
... there are substantive differences in many norms of the
Special Part established by individual republic criminal laws.
These differences reflect not merely nationality, local, and other
peculiarities connected with the historical development of these
republics,
but also reflect the will of union republics as sovereign
3
states.
Much obviously must depend upon one's notion of what is
consequential, why the differences do exist, and what is to be
accomplished by studying them in a comparative framework. The
present USSR Constitution of 1936 in its original redaction
contemplated the enactment of federal or all-union codes of law;
these would replace most republic codes of the 1920s and reflect the
enhanced powers accorded to the central government under the
constitutional reforms. Despite the preparation and discussion of
many drafts, the federal codes were never enacted, and in February
1957 the USSR Constitution was amended so that union republics
would enact codes 6f law appropriate to their circumstances but at
the same time not inconsistent with all-union fundamental principles
of legislation whose provisions were imperative throughout the
land. This was, one may say, an expressly sanctioned diversity
2. N. I. Zagorodnikov, in Ugolovnoe pravo. Chast' Osobennaia(Moscow, 1968)
at 17. The learned author does not raise the issue at all in his recent study,
Sovetskoe ugolovnoepravo.Obshchaiai Osobennaiachast' (Moscow, 1975).
3. See M. I. lakubovich in N. I. Zagorodnikov, M. I. lakubovich, and V. A.
Valadimirov, eds., Sovetskoe ugolovnoe pravo. Chast' Osobennaia (Moscow,
1965) at 7.
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within what is conceived as a coordinated relationship in spheres of
competence between the central and union republic authorities;
there also exists tolerated diversity between all-union and union
republic legislation that is reflected in a helter-skelter of normative
acts at all levels.
The fundamental premise remains intact, however, that despite
its "complexity", the Soviet Union as a federated state is
"characterized by a unity determined by the socio-political and
economic unity of the socialist social and state system." (p.6 8 ).
This is seen in the close proximity of the texts of the respective
all-union and union and autonomous republic constitutions, in the
principle that all-union legislation is superior to that of the union
republics, in the use of fundamental principles to lay down
imperative all-union rules and bring conceptual unity to union
republic codes, and, on the practical level, schemes whereby
all-union organizations review and advise at the drafting stage on
codes or other legislation of the union republics.
This unity, or "fact of monolithic unity", as some Soviet jurists
call it, "in substance and form", (p.75) is said to exist not in a
federal state but in afederatedunion of fifteen sovereign republics,
who express their sovereignty in part by legislating within the
competence not reserved to the central authorities. Textual
comparisons of union republic legislation - and the evidence of
union republic originality is exclusively of this nature in the present
volume - suggest the differences are legion. Criminal legislation
already has been alluded to above; less than half of the articles in the
union republic civil codes coincide, and only 61 of the 329 articles
in the RSFSR code of Civil Procedure have exact counterparts in the
other union republics. Family legislation also exhibits many
differences.
As for the origin and importance of such differences, there is not
consensus among the authors. Some are attributed to editorial
deficiencies or inaccuracies, which is perhaps somewhat surprising
given the amount of consultation and advice available to union
republic drafting commissions. There is a time factor involved as
well; the union republic codes are not enacted simultaneously and
hence some may reflect developments in subsequent legislation,
legislative technique, legal doctrine, Party policy, and so forth. In
some instances there would appear to be genuine disagreements
among drafters as to what is the best formulation of an article or the
best resolution of a particular problem. Indeed, the Soviet legal
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system would appear to offer an excellent arena for experimentation
with various legal solutions in different union republics,4 but there
is no indication in this volume that the search for the best
approaches has been deliberately undertaken in this fashion.
Local conditions and national peculiarities also are diversely
assessed as an element responsible for divergencies among the
codes. In their comparative historical analysis of union republic
constitutions, Faiziev and Karimova point to both terminological
nuances among the constitutions reflective of national and cultural
differences and to the fact that the Central Asian union republics
advanced directly from feudalism to socialism, omitting the
capitalist phase, which also accounts for distinctiveness in
constitutional provisions. But the message of their comparative
research is that such divergencies may no longer be necessary and
new constitutions should be in greater accord than even the present
models.
Family law would seem to be a prime example of union republics
adapting their codes to national traditions and mores. But one recent
Soviet study challenges the assumption that differences in family
legislation are chiefly attributable to such factors. 5 A. I. Pergament,
on the other hand, regards differences among the republic codes in
the minimum marriageable age as dependent "wholly on nationality
and local conditions." But the familiar explanation that Central
Asian and Caucasian girls "ripen earlier" is rejected. It is not
physicial or climatic factors but social mores that are said to be
decisive; it is suggested, for example, that a young marriage in
European Russia is not likely to interfere with the bride's schooling,
whereas in Central Asia the husband is likely to insist his bride leave
school.
There are very few references to judicial practice in the study.
Pergament does call attention to Article 23 of the Kirgiz Family
Code, which is the only union republic code expressly to empower
courts to recognize separate ownership in property acquired during a
marriage by one spouse but after marital relations had in actuality
ceased. In most other republics the same result is reached by the
4. The 1965 economic reforms in the management of the national economy were
tried on a pilot basis for several years in order to evaluate their potential
effectiveness.
5. V. I. Li, Novaia kodifikatsiia zakonodatel'stva soiuznykh respublik o brake i
sem'e (opytsravnitel'nogoissledovaniia)(Moscow, 1972). (diss. kand. iuridicheskikh nauk).

620 The Dalhousie Law Journal

courts, though by other means: the property so acquired is
recognized as jointly owned but an exceptional departure from the
principle of equality is permitted to allow the transfer of property to
the spouse who acquired it during the period of separate residence.
Pergament thinks the Kirgiz rule should be inserted in all the family
codes. No explanation is offered as to why the Kirgiz drafters chose
to include the rule in the first place.
Having convincingly demonstrated the usefulness of comparative
enquiries into Soviet law, the authors refrain in this volume from
seeking a consensus as to what objectives Soviet comparative
studies should ultimately pursue. This is perhaps a more crucial
issue in the USSR, where much, if not most, legal research is
carried on in pursuance of plans confirmed within state-funded
institutions or commissioned expressly by government agencies. In
theory at least research should be conducted in needed areas and the
results used in the policy process. Among the possible areas of
concentration alluded to in passing is the identification of
"unjustified" differences in union republic legislation. This is a
"federalist" orientation and is especially pronounced in constitutional and economic law. 6 Unjustified differences presumably
would become candidates for a unification of law on the issues in
question. What is commonly called descriptive comparison is
strongly urged and apparently still at a low level of development.
Making Soviet law students and jurists aware of substantive
differences in union republic legislation through classroom
instruction and textbooks would seem to be at an early stage; the
RSFSR is still taken as the basic model. Finding "gaps" in
legislation promises to be a fruitful application of the comparative
method within Soviet law. The authors of this volume call attention
to several, chiefly through textual comparison, but seem surprisingly reluctant to probe further in order to assess the significance of
these gaps through empirical investigations of judicial practice or
social relations. 7 There also is some suggestion that union republic
6. Economic law is not discussed in this study, but concern over unwarranted
divergencies in legislation regulating the national economy and a rejection of the
fundamental principles-union republic code approach is manifest in discussions of
the draft USSR Economic Code. The drafters strongly support an all-union code for
this branch of law, as exists for air law, merchant shipping and rail transport. For
the text of the introduction to the draft economic code and extracts of provisions,
see 12 Soviet Statutes andDecisions(1976).
7. There is no objection in principle, it would seem, against broadening
comparative research to include empirical assessments of the law. A recent Letter
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legislation and experience have something to teach other countries.
The legal model of the Central Asian union republics is regarded as
relevant to the People's Republic of Mongolia, 8 and presumably to
many third world states.
William E. Butler
Professor of Comparative Law
University of London
of the USSR Ministry of Justice to all USSR ministries and departments containing

"Recommendations Relating to the Preparation of Normative Acts of USSR

Ministries and Departments", approved October 16, 1975, stipulates that when
preparing draft legislation, ministries and departments should study "the practice
of applying prevailing normative acts, as well as data from sociological and other
research if such has been done; if necessary, one should perform such research

aimed at disclosing the effectiveness, economic cost, and usefulness of prevailing
acts and the optimal directions for improving them. In addition ... " one should
study union republic legislation, decisions and recommendations of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, international treaties, legislation of foreign
countries, and other documents" (point 17). See [1976] Biulleten' normativnykh

aktov ministerstv i vedomstv (No. 1) at 43-48; translated in 12 Soviet Statutes and
Decisions(1976).

8. A basic text on Mongolian criminal procedure collectively authored by
Mongolian jurists was published by a Moscow publishing house in the Russian
language. This was an original edition, not a translation. See Zh. Avikha and V.E.
Chugunov, eds., Ugolovnyi protsess Mongol'skoi narodnoi respubliki (Moscow,

1974).

Theory of InternationalLaw. By Grigorii I. Tunkin. Translated,
with an Introduction, by William E. Butler. London: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 1974. Pp. xxv, 447 with Bibliography, Glossary,
Tables and Index. Price: £8.00.
When one considers how East-West relations have dominated the
international politics of the post-Second World War world, it is
astonishing that so few important works such as this have been
translated into English. This volume, first published in Moscow in
1970, is the work of the foremost theoretician of international law in
the Soviet Union today. Academician Tunkin's translator, Professor
William E. Butler of University College London, correctly
describes the treatise as, "the most profound and comprehensive
study of international legal theory yet produced by a Soviet jurist."
(p.xv). That, if nothing else, should attract for this book a wide and
important audience.
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Academician Tunkin is an erudite man; few international
lawyers, particularly those trained in the common law tradition, are
able to draw so fruitfully on such a wide range of scholarly
materials. One does not have to read far into this book to realize that
Academician Tunkin is first and foremost a diplomat, a practising
international lawyer, indeed, he may be described as a black-letter
law man of the finest kind.
Most of the pressing theoretical questions concerning the nature
of international law are discussed including the nature of customary
international law, its relationship to treaty law, the legal nature of
resolutions of the United Nations, the role of the International Court
of Justice in the development of international law, the nature and
function of "general principles of law" as described in the Statute
of the ICJ, the relationship of law and diplomacy or politics and the
nature and function of international organizations today.
The treatment by Tunkin of the difficult problem of the
development and identification of customary international law is
interesting and does much to dispel the widely-held view in North
America that little regard is had for customary international law in
the Soviet system. Certainly, the author expresses the standard
Soviet view that treaty law is today more important and satisfactory
as a means for the progressive development of international law but
most practising Canadian international lawyers would undoubtedly
express a similar preference if pressed. On the other hand, his
scientific positivist approach to law sounds a little quaint when he
shifts to international adjudication and says boldly of the ICJ that
"The Court does not create international law; it applies it" (p. 191).
This viewpoint may appeal to those who wish to make a priestly
class of those who "apply" the law but does not conform to most
modem views on the nature of the judicial process.
One of the most interesting sections of the book for North
Americians is the critique of Myres McDougal who is accused of
having "drown[ed] international law in policy." (p. 297). All
lawyers are (or should be) aware of the almost imperceptible line
between law and politics and the ease with which one can stumble
into error by emphasizing one over the other to the extent of creating
a serious imbalance, especially when the over-emphasis is in the
policy or political direction. Even Lester Pearson can be criticized
for fudging the problem and not leaving an adequate place for
international law in international relations (pp. 285-6).
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The book is uneven in places, particularly where Academician
Tunkin takes time to give "card-index" summaries of the views of
various jurists on certain points. A less quantitative and more
qualitative approach would have been more rewarding for the
reader, although one cannot but admire the obvious hard work
which has gone into the collection of the materials. For example,
some of the writings of such luminaries as J. F. Dulles and W.
Knowland are as in need of "correction" as some of the
"clarifications" which Tunkin makes in the writings of Soviet
jurists of the pre-Khrushchev era.
Despite some forays into the sophisticated terminology used by
communist lawyers in analyzing international law from an
ideological point of view, the book remains remarkably free of
ideological jargon and will have an appeal to a wider world
audience as a result. Academician Tunkin's work is required
reading for every international lawyer who is interested not only in
Soviet international legal theory but in the ideas of one of the
handful of theoreticians at work in international law today.
Brian Flemming
Stewart, MacKeen and Covert
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Canadian Tort Law: Cases, Notes and Materials. By Cecil A.
Wright and Allen M. Linden. 6th ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1975.
Pp. xxx, 768. Price: $39.50 (cloth), $25.00 (paperback).
This brief review is divided into two separate but inter-related parts.
In the first I will deal with CanadianTort Law from the perspective
of a front line user of the product, i.e., as a torts teacher who has
used this text and its previous editions for a number of years. In the
second I will propose that certain substantial additions be made to
this volume in order to maximize its value.
At the outset I wish to make it clear that I greatly admire this
casebook and have always enjoyed teaching from it. It reflects in
large measure Professor Linden's infectious enthusiasm for his
subject which, when added to this area of the law's inherent
interest, makes it a highly readable as well as a highly instructive
book. Several years ago the author paid a visit to the Faculty of Law

624 The Dalhousie Law Journal

at Dalhousie and spoke informally to the student body.' His
remarks, with customary exuberance, were entitled "Long Live
Torts!" As is to be imagined he ranged far and wide - torts as
ombudsman, torts and deterrence, the educational role of torts, the
psychology of torts, etc. When he had finished he invited comments
and the first was, "You have told us a lot of reasons why torts
should survive. I can tell you why it should survive in the first year
curriculum - it's fun!" As a teacher I too find torts fun, in large
measure because of the general excellence of this casebook.
As its sub-title "Cases, Notes and Materials" indicates, this book
is much more than a mere collection of cases but includes, as well,
very valuable extracts from law review articles and treatises, law
reform commission studies, and statutes and regulations. The notes
which interconnect the major cases are well organized and challenge
the reader with pointed and perceptive questions. Each chapter has a
particularly valuable introductory section which outlines in broad
terms the matters to be dealt with therein and most chapters
conclude with a useful review problem.
The book's arrangement is traditional in that it starts with the
intentional torts and their defences and then moves in a systematic
way through negligence and strict liability. I particularly approve of
the decision to plunge students straight into the central standard of
care question leaving duty until later; the sixty page chapter devoted
to damages; the very full chapter on products liability which
provides an excellent opportunity for review and consolidation and
the fifty page closing chapter on automobile accident compensation
and the future of torts. There is also a fine introductory chapter
which, as the author points out, can be read with profit both at the
start and again at the completion of the course.
Technically this book is well put together with relatively few
errors. However, the index is weak and confusing. This can be a
serious problem if the subject is not dealt with in a predictable place
in the text. For example, there is no entry for "limitation period"
which is to be found in a section on "Necessity of damage"; nor is
there one for "punitive damages" or "exemplary damages" which
is dealt with, not in the chapter on damages, but in a note in the
1. He later spoke at a conference organized by the Public Services Committee.
See, "Current Developments in No-Fault Automobile Insurance" in H. N.
Janisch, ed., Recent Developments in Torts and Automobile Insurance (Halifax:
Dalhousie University Faculty of Law, 1974) at 73-93 (Dalhousie Continuing Legal
Education Series, No. 5).
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chapter on intentional torts; nor is there one to "per quod servitium
amisit" or "loss of services" a matter which is to be found (with
luck) in the notes on economic loss. A more startling omission is the
lack of any reference at all to "custom" although there is, in fact, a
good section on that subject included in the chapter on standard of
care. Good use is made throughout of the Restatement of Torts,
Second, although one might have expected a suitable explanatory
note for Canadian students. Incidentally, a delightfully provocative
typographical error which referred to the "Replacement of Torts,
Second" has not been repeated in this edition.
Let me turn, now, to some more serious matters. All law
teachers, and perhaps torts teachers in particular, have their own pet
cases. Therefore, any new edition of a casebook threatens old and
true friends with demotion to the notes. Such, over the years, has
been the fate of a number of cases which this reviewer feels are of
sufficient pedagogical value to warrant continued prominence. For
example, his much beloved Penfolds Wines 2 is now summarily
dismissed as a "nightmare of a case" and given a scant ten lines of
text. What then is to happen to that bottle of the appropriate
Australian wine which, until this year, was flourished in graphic
pantomime fashion in an effort to illustrate the difference between
trepass to chattels and conversion? How can one now honestly reply
in the affirmative to one of those earnest questionnaires as to the
employment of "multi-media and other teaching aids"? What of
Halifax-DartmouthBridge Commission3 which graphically demonstrated how three judges could separately arrive at the same
conclusion via trespass, negligence, and Rylands v. Fletcher?
Moreover, for a teacher in Halifax this latter case has the great
advantage of involving a prominent local landmark and not some far
off railway platform in New York, cricket ground in London or
wharf in Sydney.
Nor do I fully understand why such excellent teaching cases as
Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan4 or Cudney v. Clements
Motor Sales Ltd. 5 should have to be severely pruned and confined to
the notes. I would also urge that the famous "misdelivered parcels
2. Penfolds Wines Proprietaryv. Elliott (1946), 74 C.L.R. 204 (H. C. Aust.).
3. Vaughn v. Halifax-DartmouthBridge Commission (1961), 29 D.L.R. (2d) 523
(N.S.S.C.).
4. (1966), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436 (Sask. C.A.).
5. [196912 O.R. 209 (Ont. C.A.).
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case", Turner v. Thorne, 6 which stands for the striking proposition
that a trespasser to land is liable for all harm which flows from his
trespass, is worthy of greater prominence than given it - especially
if it is intended to contrast this position with the proximate cause of
negligence. It would also be my view that the section on
"Cause-in-Fact" would be strengthened by promoting Kauffman v.
TTC, 7 and that Videan, 8 the heroic stationmaster case, be included
at the start of the section on rescue so as to lay the foundations for
the subsequent discussion as to whether a rescuer is owed a
derivative or an independent duty of care. Finally, I would suggest
that in an unnecessary effort to bolster the chapter on "Products
Liability", Rivtow Marine9 has been wrongly treated as a products
case and not as a significant development in the whole broader issue
of recovery for economic loss.
It has been my experience in teaching torts that some functional
exposure to the history of the shift from trespass to negligence is
essential to give students an overview of where we are going. I have
found that Charles Gregory, "Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability" 10 admirably serves this purpose. An edited version of
this article might usefully be employed at the outset of the
negligence section. The refusal of the Supreme Court of Canada to
take the opportunity presented it in Goshen v. Larin1 ' to decide,
once and for all, whether trespass should survive in Canada, is
going to be the bane of torts teachers for some time to come. I
would suggest that cases such as Hollebone v. Barnard,12 Dahlberg
v. Naydiuk1 3 and Goshen v. Larin cannot simply be summarily
dismissed as "holdovers from days gone by". Indeed, to the extent
that they shift the onus of proof immediately on to the defendant
they may be more closely in keeping with current values than
negligence cases.
In turning to the second half of this review I would start by
pointing to the breadth of the title, Canadian Tort Law. In recent
6.
7.
8.
9.

(1960), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 29 (Ont. H.C.).
[1960] S.C.R. 251.
Videan v. British TransportCommission, [1963] 2 Q.B. 650 (C.A.).
Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530

(S.C.C.).
10. (1951), 37 Va.L.Rev. 359.
11. (1975), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 66 (S.C., A.D.), leave to appeal refused,[1974]
S.C.R. ix.
12. [1954] 2 D.L.R. 278 (Ont. H.C.).
13. (1970), 10D.L.R. (3d) 319 (Man. C.A.).

Canadian Tort Law: Cases, Notes and Materials 627

editions this title has become quite misleading because nuisance and
defamation are not included at all while vicarious liability, animals,
occupier's liability and privacy, for example, are only covered in
notes of uneven quality. It is my view that the author should be
encouraged to expand his text to cover his title. Indeed, in this
period of rampant statism, I would urge that a chapter be added on
government liability which can be built on the existing sections
dealing with the applicability of Hedley Byrne to government and
the liability of municipalities for failure to maintain highways and
the police for failure to warn of hazards on the highway. Such a
chapter would also provide an opportunity for a full-scale treatment
of the notorious omission case, East Suffolk Catchment Board, 14
which in the present edition does not even have a separate existence
of its own.
This proposal for an expansion in a basic first year casebook will
provoke three readily predictable objections. First, how much can
we expect first year students to absorb? We already have a seven
hundred and sixty page casebook; your proposal will put it over one
thousand pages. My answer is that each teacher will have to choose
how much is to be covered as has already to be done by those of us
who add supplements on nuisance and vicarious liability and cut
back somewhat in other areas. This is precisely the sort of freedom
which a really good and comprehensive casebook gives the
individual instructor. Most importantly, it will give the student a
single compact text which will provide him with a true working
introduction to Canadian tort law. In response to the second
objection, I cannot deny that this proposal would lead to an increase
in price, but it seems to me that the additional value of
comprehensiveness would more than offset the short term cost.
Finally, what of the objection that we should not devote even
more scarce resources to a subject which is an anachronism in a
welfare state? In reply I can do no better than refer such critic to the
book itself. If torts is dying it is going out with a bang and not a
whimper. It still provides our students with a feel for the common
law's struggle for justice in individual cases as well as an
introduction to a public law perspective through an analysis of
statutory schemes for reform. Torts is without an equal as a first
year course - especially when we are fortunate enough to have a

14. EastSuffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent, [1941] A.C. 74 (H.L.).
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casebook of such quality that the only really serious criticism of it is
that there is not enough of it.
H. N. Janisch
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University

CriticalCriminology. Edited by I. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. Pp. xii, 268.
CriticalCriminology is the sequel to The New Criminology', which
appeared in 1973. In The New CriminologyIan Taylor, Paul Walton
and Jock Young, three British criminologists, authored an
inspired and provocative critique of the methods and philosophy of
traditional criminology. There they argued that the perspectives of
the dominant schools of criminological thought spawned a myopic
insolence which dictated criminological method and necessarily
precluded an accurate perception of deviance in contemporary
social theory. What was required, they argued, was a paradigmatic
shift of the discipline to accommodate alternative perceptions of
social reality, particularly dialectical materialism.
Now, in CriticalCriminology, Taylor, Walton and Young have
attempted to expand upon this theme from The New Criminology by
editing a series of essays designed to acquaint the reader with some
of the fundamental literature of radical criminology, literature
which goes beyond the "hip concerns" of the sociology of
deviance 2 to the point of beginning to measure the parameters of
critical criminology, the alternative approach to traditional
criminology. 3
The first essay, written by Taylor, Walton and Young, entitled
"Critical Criminology in Britain: Review and Prospects" is little
more than a restatement of some of the arguments from The New
Criminology. It is the longest essay in the book and in many ways
sets the tone for the remaining essays: it says nothing really new, it
is brilliantly critical, but it offers no insight as to how the lofty
1. I. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young, The New Criminology (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1973).
2. I Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young, Critical Criminology (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1975) at 3.
3. Id. at 3-4.
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objectives of a "materialist criminology" 4 are to be implemented in
the day to day world of either the academic or practising
criminologist. It, .ineffect, urges criminologists to develop a
criminology which is "normatively committed to the abolition of
inequalities in wealth and power'' 5 without providing the building
blocks with which to construct such a criminology.
This criticism of the lead essay should, however, be read against
the fact that four of the remaining nine essays do provide reasonably
clear directions for critical criminology. Jock Young's thoughtful
essay entitled "Working-class Criminology" attacks deviance
theorists (whom he calls voyeurs) and argues that deviancy theory,
which surfaced in the 1960s as an alternative to conservative
criminological thought, suffered from an inversion of the
conceptual framework of its positivist opponents. He argues that
what is needed for a truly new and innovative deviance theory is a
rejection of this pattern of thought and the acceptance of an
alternative approach utilizing new paradigms of thought. Only then
will we be able to understand why, for example, people seem to be
more disturbed by offences of the poor than offences of the rich,
such as white-collar crime.
Herman and Julia Schmendinger's essay, "Defenders of Order or
Guardians of Human Rights?", although it is primarily a critique of
all positions in the "How shall we define crime?" debate which
dominated criminological thought a few decades ago, challenges the
criminologist to transcend the legal definition of crime and adopt a
broader perspective on deviance by including in the definition of
crime things which violate human rights, such as an imperialist war,
racism, sexism and poverty crimes. They succeed in their limited
purpose of suggesting realistically to criminologists that the blind
acceptance of a legal definition to the limits of criminological
enquiry is improper and that a criminological definition incorporating the intrinsic aspirations of people towards human rights is more
appropriate.
The third essay which clearly complements the editors' lead essay
is William Chambliss's "The Political Economy of Crime: a
Comparative Study of Nigeria and the USA". Chambliss's
approach is invigorating to the reader anxious to test the results of
critical criminology against traditional criminology. He isolates
4. Id. at 44 et seq..
5. Id.at44.
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eight hypotheses from both functional theory and dialectical theory
and tests them on empirical data from Nigeria and America. Not
surprisingly, the dialectical hypotheses offer a more acceptable
explanation of crime. Chambliss may be criticized for his selectivity
in criminal statistics studied, but his point, which is that dialectical
materialism can serve as an excellent research tool, is made well.
The final essay which appears to build upon Taylor, Walton, and
Young's opening essay is Richard Quinney's "Crime Control in
Capitalist Society: a Critical Philosophy of Legal Order".
Quinney's now famous essay purports to analyze four approaches to
knowledge: positivism, social constructionism, phenomenology
and critical philosophy. His conclusion is, obviously, that it is time
for a critical philosophy to emerge in the discipline, such as it is, of
criminology.
The remaining five essays in CriticalCriminology run to various
themes. In "Prospects for a Radical Criminology in the USA",
Tony Platt essentially gives Taylor, Walton and Young's lead essay
an intensely personal and distinctively American application. Geoff
Pearson attempts in "Misfit Sociology and the Politics of
Socialization" to identify a cross-disciplinary contemporary
approach to social problems which is "characterized primarily by
an 'insider' perspective which many took for 'phenomenology', a
ready sympathy for the underdog, and a theoretical tendency
towards de-reification".6 He titles this approach "misfit sociology" and attempts in the essay to identify its radical components
and demonstrate the characteristics which both link it to and divide
it from critical criminology.
Three essays in CriticalCriminology are devoted to an exchange
of ideas between Paul Hirst and two of the editors of the volume
concerning the proper meaning to be attributed to Marx and Engel's
statements on crime. Hirst, unlike many critical criminologists, has
clearly read Marx and attempted his own analysis of Marxian
thought. Despite the editors' offhanded treatment of this series of
essays in the introduction it is clear from their response to his first
essay that Hirst' s analysis did little to reinforce their selfperceptions as dialectical materialists. Hirst's first essay entitled
"Marx and Engels on Law, Crime and Morality" points, somewhat
embarrassingly to some radical criminologists, to Marx's views on
crime during the various intellectual periods of his life and to his
6. Id. at 148.
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occasional statements regarding crime and criminals which today
fall far to the right of positivist criminology. Taylor and Walton
respond to Hirst in an essay entitled, "Radical Deviancy Theory
and Marxism: a Reply to Hirst". Their response, which clearly falls
tragically below the level of scholarship attained in The New
Criminology, lapses into personalities, fails to attend to Hirst's
arguments and ends up by simply repeating a call for radical
criminology. Hirst's final essay, "Radical Deviancy Theory and
Marxism: a Reply to Taylor and Walton", restates his case clearly
and concisely and calls Taylor and Walton to task for their
unprofessional response to his arguments.
The Critical Criminology is likely to be one of those books which
every aspiring criminologist Will be required to read. In many ways
that is unfortunate, for it clearly is not of the same quality as other
works in this field. While it is true that most of the truly outstanding
critical criminologists are heard from in CriticalCriminology, it is
also true that most of the essays offer nothing really new to the field
and many are little more than reprints from other sources.
Nor can Critical Criminology be characterized as a collection of
the outstanding works in radical criminology in one comprehensive
and well-organized volume. The ten essays in Critical Criminology
do not fall into the order in which they were presented in this
review. They fall instead into what appears to be an almost
haphazard pattern of random thoughts on critical criminology.
CriticalCriminology is not a book which need be used by anyone
with a basic working knowledge of the principles and arguments of
radical criminology. In the final analysis, Critical Criminology,
perhaps because of the natural tendency to compare it with its
editors' brilliant predecessor, The New Criminology, is a most
disappointing book. Tragically, it may demonstrate more the
intellectual bankruptcy of radical criminology than its intellectual
vitality. If CriticalCriminology is the best that people of the calibre
of Taylor, Walton and Young can do, then critical criminology may
become just another footnote in the drab, positivistic history of
contemporary North American criminology. Hopefully that will not
be the case.
Jim Ortego
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University
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Law and Society. By Adam Podg6recki. London and Boston:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974. Pp. 302. Price: $19.05.
The sociology of law has increasingly developed into a major theory
of jurisprudence. Podgbrecki, a leading sociologist at the University
of Warsaw, argues in his book "Law and Society" that the viability
of a legal system is directly dependent upon the changing realities
within society.
The book, the first written by Podgbrecki in English, revolves
around two conflicting approaches towards the law: an acceptance
of social behaviouralism coupled with a rejection of analytic legal
positivism. As his central theme, he propagates that the .study and
functioning of law should depend upon a careful scientific
investigation conducted into human behaviour. The law will
progress as society develops. The form and content of the law will
depend upon the socio-economic, cultural and political superstructure prevailing within society. Thus, the legal system will remain
functionally ineffective if it fails to conform to socially acceptable
morals, community habits and business practices. Podgbrecki
accordingly submits that social norms dictate legal form and that
legal effectiveness must be measured by its responsiveness to
interdisciplinary realities.
The construction of a flexible and socially responsive role that
should be possessed by a legal system carries with it an instinctive
disdain for the analytical positivist premise that the law is a system
which defines its own scope of operation without further recourse to
sociological evaluation. The absolute, rigid and elevated rules of
law postulated by analytical jurisprudents like Kant and Austin are
accordingly undermined by Podg6recki's pragmatic examination of
society's habits, customs and attitudes. The development of
controls over human behaviour via the criminal process should thus
echo the recidivist and societal responsiveness towards punitive and
retributive, preventative and rehabilitative policies. As an example,
Podg6recki acknowledges that a clear rule which favours a
particular form and method of criminal punishment, devised
abstractly and without regard to relevant social circumstances, may
provide the legal machinery with certainty and predictability.
Nevertheless, this concise criminal rule may be ineffective simply
because the strict norm will fail to acknowledge that society mores
may disfavour the proposed criminal sanctions as unnecessary,
unjust, inflexible or in conflict with social convention.

Law and Society 633

Podg6recki argues that a legal system should not be based upon
Austin's Command Theory or Kant's Categorical Imperative where
a sovereign leader commands obedience from the subject by means
of strict, arbitrary and incontestable rules. He contends that these
generalized and conceptualized definitions developed by leading
positivists fail to acknowledge that law has a far broader and more
realistic content and scope. Viable law, for instance, may exist in a
stateless community where no sovereign ruler prevails. So too the
law may find its origin and support in social desirability rather than
in an Imperative Command. Similarly, law is often obeyed, not on
account of the legal sanction that it might carry, but instead on
account of its acceptable social design. The essence and strength of
the legal system, Podg6recki therefore maintains, is derived from a
scientifically established social acceptability of the law rather than
from any formalized concepts of the legal validity and legitimacy of
law reflected in rigid and arbitrary rules.
What functional form should the law assume? Podgbrecki
submits, as did Huntington Cairns before him, that it is impossible
to discover how law operates unless one has a greater knowledge of
the factors that cause change in society and govern its evolution.
The suitability and form of law aimed at controlling parental
discipline over children, for example, all require the following
sociological studies: an investigation of the uniformity of social
sentiment towards legal control; the influence of such factors as age,
income, sex, education and religion upon these social inclinations;
the reasons and motives for such views; and finally, the significant
influence of these sociological investigations upon the proposed
legal innovations (p. 115).
The reliability of this purpose-oriented study will depend upon
the form of the scientific methods used. The investigator's
methodological tools may include a combination of the following:
an historical, comparative and ethnographic study of social, cultural
and political attitudes towards parental authority; an analysis of
existing legal materials on this subject; and the use of questionnaires
and interviews conducted with selected samples of the relevant
community.
Podg6recki informs us that a study of parental authority
conducted in the United States along these scientific lines provided
a series of conclusions of significance in the development of law
governing parental discipline. The investigation established that
males,Protestants, and educated and wealthy members of the
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community tend to accept limitations upon parental authority more
willingly than do women, Catholics or less educated and poorer
members. Even more generally, the study displayed that parental
authority is usually invoked to the child's advantage; that general
public opinion supports statutory intervention so long as it provides
for the appropriate rearing and education of children; and that the
public favoured more autonomy for children than the existing laws
actually permitted. The study revealed further that American
legislatures are vulnerable to pressure from the wealthier and better
organized pressure groups, bent on directing the law to favour their
values. Judges tend to stress traditional social and cultural values on
the subject of parental authority. And finally, the suitable form of
legal regulation will depend, in addition to all the above, upon the
intensity of social opinion and habit; the rational and emotional
attitudes of the community towards the proposed legal innovation;
as well as public awareness of the existing or suggested legal
principles and rules governing parental authority.
The essential merits of Podg6recki's approach towards law lie in
his justifiable submission that a legal system that is unresponsive to
community values and morality frequently lacks functional
efficiency. The eminent author reiterates Ehrlich's demand that
major advances in a legal system require an increasingly exhaustive
analysis of the facts. Like Frankfurter's school of "Fact-Sceptics",
Podg~recki argues that rules are often inappropriately formulated
and poorly applied in real situations simply because courts tend to
misapply the facts in different legal contexts. A decision rendered
on a question of marriage or divorce, communism or capitalism,
would indeed be meaningless if no due regard were paid to the
prevailing era, community values and persons being studied.
Podg6recki is therefore justified in his primary recourse to fact
study. A number of pertinent questions, however, arise as to the
method and reliability of Podg6recki's behavioural study and its
importance in the development of a pragmatic legal system.
First, the dynamic open-ended character of Podg6recki's
interdisciplinary approach is as much a weakness as a strength. The
sophistication of the fact study and analysis of society proposed by
Podg~recki depend upon a parllel sophistication of development
within the social sciences themselves. Yet the normative sciences,
such as psychology and sociology, as Podg~recki himself admits,
are still infant and as yet an inadequate foundation for convincing
legal analysis. This reality is particularly evidenced by the fact that
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the scientific methods advanced by Podgbrecki are far less reliable
in a social science context than they are within the pure sciences. In
mathematics and chemistry, for instance, the relevant variables are
known and capable of laboratory experimentation. A study of
human behaviour, on the other hand, involves many intangible
variables that are incapable of controlled study and measurement.
Questionnaire and interview methods produce far less reliable
conclusions when compared to known chemicals mixed at particular
temperatures with particular physical results occurring.
Podgbrecki's desire to base law upon a study of society therefore
remains an ideal to be striven for, but in the light of the above
evidence, never quite attained.
Secondly, there are similar contrasting strengths and weaknesses
in Podgbrecki's conclusive denial of a rule oriented approach
towards legal development. It is true that arbitrary formal rules
developed by the positivists may lack viability within a dynamic and
demanding sociological environment. Nevertheless, when Podg6recki stresses the need for law to conform to social demands, he
ignores the fact that the prestige and respect for law can be traced in
part to the independent and elevated character of the legal system.
Independence of function, for instance, is one earmark of an
efficient judiciary. Similarly, a logical and analytical reasoning
method is a noticeable feature of the lawyer's training. This legal
exposure to analysis is an indispensable element in perceiving the
variant relevancies of fact situations and in translating them into
mandatory or suppletive legal form. A study of sociology
accordingly only supplements rather than displaces this analytical
lawyering process.
Podg6recki also fails to acknowledge that the functioning of a
legal system may well extend beyond a mirrored reflection of social
demands. Thus, the law may legitimately prescribe human
behaviour in accordance with policies founded upon law and order
and/or fairness to the individual even though a large contingent of
society, motivated by ignorance or contrasting punitive interests,
may unjustifiably condemn the legal result. Nor should we ignore
that the ultimate basis of legal development lies in a choice among
conflicting policies and interests. A choice must be made, for
example, between a policy aimed at protecting wealth and a
contrasting interest in avoiding human suffering created by
inadequate bargaining skills. While sociological study may assist in
this policy consideration process, the ultimate choice will invariably
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lie in a philosophy of values. And it is the distinctive legal system
itself, armed with its constant exposure to both formal law and
social circumstances, that is best equipped to translate general
policies into appropriate legal form.
Podgbrecki, in his contention that law depends upon the careful
scientific study of sociology, also ignores the fact that a legal
system may contain its own inherent fact study methods, existing
independently of complex sociological methodology superimposed
upon the legal system. The examination of witnesses, the use of
experts in psychiatry and sociology, the indulgence of courts in
precedent and comparative study are all illustrations of continual
fact studies and sociological investigations that are part and parcel
of any legal system. Podg6recki's functional theory of law therefore
fails to give full credibility to the innate capacity of a legal system to
reflect realities without resort to cpmplex behavioural studies.
Podg6recki's book provides a valuable lesson in methods of fact
study, so often ignored by legislatures, courts and lawyers. Yet, like
so many other approaches towards law, the learned author
propagates only one general descriptive method of legal development. Podg6recki fails in his attempt to completely gainsay the
positivist contention that law must be translated into a further
prescriptive body of rules and concepts, developed and applied
through an inherent training in stri6t legal analysis. The eminent
author succeeds admirably, however, in his appeal for intensified
studies into human behaviour as one means of developing a
functionally effective system of legal rules and principles.
Leon Trakman
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University

